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This Essay explores the largely overlooked relationship between
claim construction and patent assertion entities (patent “trolls”), finding
that claim construction problems and trends benefit patent assertion
entities. First, the Federal Circuit is deeply divided as to the proper
approach to claim construction. This split is a significant contributor to
uncertain patent scope, which is widely-recognized as a core reason for the
rise and success of patent assertion entities. Second, case law and
commentary increasingly endorse an approach to claim construction that
relies on the “general meaning” in the technical field with limited reliance
on the patent itself. This approach increases the breadth and uncertainty of
patent scope, the exact conditions under which patent assertion entities
thrive. Third, the Supreme Court’s recent adoption of a more deferential
standard of review for claim construction in Teva v. Sandoz is widely
praised. However, because patent assertion entities file in favorable district
courts, like the Eastern District of Texas, deferential review increases both
the benefits patent assertion entities receive from favorable districts and
their incentive to file in those districts.
If patent assertion entities are as problematic as widely thought,
these claim construction problems and trends warrant reconsideration.
Some may argue that current claim construction rules and trends are
warranted despite their positive impact on patent assertion entities. And
other means may exist for combatting patent assertion entities without
altering claim construction rules or trends. But the positive effects for
patent assertion entities must at least be factored into any cost-benefit
analysis of claim construction rules. Moreover, the fact that current claim
construction rules and trends produce the conditions under which patent
assertion entities thrive suggest that patent assertion entities may be a
symptom of larger problems with claim construction doctrine.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent claim construction – the interpretation of the short
paragraphs (or “claims”) at the end of the patent that define the scope of
the patentee’s rights – is “overwhelmingly the most critical patent issue in
litigation.”1 It is also one of the most problematic and controversial.
“Debates over whether the fundamental inquiry of patent law is broken,
and what to do if it is, engross not only observers of the patent system, but
also the judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the
appellate court entrusted with the control of patent law.”2
Patent assertion entities – also known as non-practicing entities or,
more pejoratively, patent “trolls”3 – are also one of the most important,
controversial, and arguably problematic issues in modern patent litigation.
The debate over patent assertion entities has divided academics,4 led
Congress to debate major patent reform for the second time in less than
five years,5 and even caught the attention of the popular media, including
an eleven minute segment on John Oliver’s Last Week Tonight.6
Yet, the intersection of what are two of the most important,
controversial, and problematic aspects of modern patent litigation has been
largely overlooked. Unexplored are the related questions of how claim
construction has contributed to the rise and/or viability of patent assertion
entities and what concerns about patent assertion entities mean for the
claim construction debates. Frankly, this is surprising. Problems with
1 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, __ (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013).
2 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1033 (2007).
3 The terms patent assertion entity (“PAE”), non-practicing entity (“NPE”), and
patent troll (“troll”) have different connotations but are often used interchangeably. See
David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the
Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 426 (2014).
4 Compare Letter to Congress by 51 Legal and Economics Scholars Who Study
Innovation, Intellectual Property Law, and Policy (Mar. 2, 2015), available at
http://www.utdallas.edu/~ugg041000/IPScholarsLettertoCongress_March_2_2015.pdf
(“PAE litigation has been costing firms tens of billions of dollars per year since 2007.”),
with Letter to Congress by 40 Economists and Law Professors Who Conduct Research
in Patent Law and Policy (Mar. 10, 2015), available at http://cpip.gmu.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/Economists-Law-Profs-Letter-re-Patent-Reform.pdf (“[M]uch of
the information surrounding the patent policy discussion, and in particular the
discussion of so-called “patent trolls,” is either inaccurate or does not support the
conclusions for which it is cited.”).
5 See Greg Reilly, Linking Patent Reform with Civil Litigation Reform, 47 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) (providing overview of current patent reform efforts); see
also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2012).
6 Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Patents (HBO) (Apr. 19, 2015), available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bxcc3SM_KA.

4

91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)

[22-Sep-15

patent scope – both uncertainty and overbreadth of patent scope – are
frequently identified as contributing to the rise and success of patent
assertion entities.7 And “claim construction is fundamental to determining
a patent’s scope.”8 The potential link between claim construction and
patent assertion entities is, well, patent.
This Essay tackles the overlooked connection between patent
assertion entities and claim construction. In broad strokes, the Essay
develops three major themes. First, problems with claim construction are
significant contributors to the uncertainty and breadth of claim scope,
which fuel patent assertion entities. Second, current trends in claim
construction, both in the courts and the academy, will benefit patent
assertion entities. Third, the problems and trends in claim construction
undermine other efforts to combat patent assertion entities by making it
easier for patent assertion entities to assert a non-frivolous litigation
position supportable under current law.
More specifically, an outcome-determinative split within the
Federal Circuit as to the proper approach to claim construction creates
significant uncertainty about claim scope that cannot be resolved without
litigation.9 Uncertain claim scope is widely seen as fueling patent
assertion entities. Yet, courts and commentators are increasingly ignoring
or downplaying the claim construction split when discussing patent notice
problems. Some even suggest, contrary to empirical evidence, that the split
has been resolved.10
Second, a claim construction approach that emphasizes the general
meaning in the technical field and permits only limited resort to the
disclosure in the patent itself continues to garner precedential and
scholarly support. This approach undermines ex ante predictability of
claim scope because it depends on testimony of expert witnesses and other
evidence created or identified by the parties ex post in litigation, rather
than on the publicly-available and static patent document. Moreover, even
its proponents acknowledge that it produces broader claim scope.
Uncertain and broad claim scope are conditions in which patent assertion
entities thrive, and, unsurprisingly, they tend to rely on the general
meaning line of cases.11 Yet, even as general trends in patent law seek to
constrain patent assertion entities, case law and scholars increasingly
James Bessen, The patent troll crisis is really a software patent crisis,
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2013/09/03/the-patent-troll-crisis-is-really-a-software-patent-crisis/.
8 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2007).
9 See Part II.A.1, infra.
10 See Part II.A.2, infra.
11 See Part II.B.1, infra.
7
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endorse the general meaning claim construction approach.12
Finally, the standard of appellate review for claim construction has
long been the focal point of claim construction debates, with widespread
calls in the academy and the bar for more deferential review. The Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Teva v. Sandoz heeded those calls, rejecting the
Federal Circuit’s de novo standard and providing greater deference to
district court claim constructions. Teva largely has been lauded by the
patent community, even though it is likely to help patent assertion
entities.13 After Teva, district judges have incentives to place greater
reliance on expert evidence and other external evidence, and less reliance
on the patent document itself, which will tend to create broader claims and
greater uncertainty. Moreover, patent assertion entities overwhelmingly
file in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, which tends
to favor patentees in a variety of ways, likely including claim construction.
More deferential review means more power for district courts, which
accentuates patent assertion entities’ advantage from choosing the forum
and incentivizes districts that cater to patent assertion entities to adopt
pro-patentee claim constructions.14
Having described the connection between claim construction
problems and trends and patent assertion entities, the obvious question is
what does it all mean? For those untroubled by patent assertion entities,
perhaps not much. But for the majority of the patent community that
worries, to varying extents, about the consequences of patent assertion
entities for innovation, competition, and patent litigation, this Essay
suggests that the current direction of claim construction is far from
optimal.15 Claim construction trends also indirectly undermine other
efforts to combat patent assertion entities. A variety of current proposals –
pleading standards, Rule 11 sanctions, fee shifting – attempt to punish
patent assertion entities for bringing frivolous, meritless, or weak claims.
However, the uncertainty and breadth of potential claim scope created by
the claim construction issues addressed in this Essay make it easier for a
patent assertion entity to identify a reasonable litigation position,
undermining efforts to weed out claims based on their merits.16
Of course, there may be ways to address patent assertion entities
without altering the direction of claim construction, such as venue reform,
restricting functional claiming, or improving patent examination. And
some may believe that current claim construction rules and trends are
warranted despite (or except for) their effect on patent assertion entities.
See Part II.B.2, infra.
See Part II.C.2, infra.
14 See Part II.C.1, infra.
15 See Part III.A, infra.
16 See Part III.B, infra.
12
13
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At the very least, however, claim construction should be part of the patent
assertion entity debate and the consequences for patent assertion entities
should be part of the claim construction debates.17 Moreover, the fact that
current claim construction rules and trends produce the conditions in
which patent assertion entities thrive suggests that patent assertion
entities may be a symptom that reveals underlying problems with claim
construction doctrine.18
Interestingly, and perhaps unsurprisingly, while courts, scholars,
and most other commentators have overlooked the relationship between
claim construction and patent assertion entities, the most popular targets
for patent assertion entities – large technology companies like Google,
Amazon.com, Yahoo!, Dell, and Twitter – have not. In amicus briefs in the
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court, these companies reached conclusions
similar to this Essay: the claim construction split results in uncertain
patent scope; a patent-focused approach better promotes public notice than
the “general meaning” approach; and deferential appellate review
undermines public notice and benefits patent holders.19 These technology
companies were clearly motivated by their experience with patent assertion
entities, though they left the link largely implicit.20 This Essay makes that
link explicit.
Part I provides an overview of the parallel debates over patent
assertion entities and claim construction. Part II draws the connections
between claim construction and patent assertion entities.
Part III
evaluates the consequences of these connections. A short conclusion
follows.
I. PATENT LITIGATION PROBLEMS: “TROLLS” AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
Patent assertion entities and claim construction have been two of
the most discussed and debated topics in patent law since the turn of this
century, probably only rivaled or surpassed by patentable subject matter
See Part III.A, infra.
Mark A. Lemley & Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forests for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2121 (2013) (“Patent trolls alone are not the problem; they are a
symptom of larger problems with the patent system. . . . Exposing the larger problems
allows us to contemplate changes in patent law that will actually tackle the underlying
pathologies of the patent system and the abusive conduct they enable.”).
19 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 20-22, Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015) (joined by Google, Dell,
HP, Salesforce.com, Twitter, Yahoo!, Acushnet, eBay, Kaspersky Lab, Limelight
Networks, Newegg, QVC, SAS Institute, and Xilink); Brief of Google Inc. et al. as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant 24-25 & n.3, Lighting Ballast Control LLC v.
Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (joined by Google,
Amazon, HP, Red Hat, and Yahoo!).
20 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 26-27, Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015)
17
18
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under 35 U.S.C. § 101. This Part provides brief background on the debates
over each, before turning to the relationship of patent assertion entities
and claim construction in the remainder of the Essay.
A. The Patent “Troll” Debate
1. Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debate
In recent years, patent assertion entities have been central to most
debates over the patent system. Patent assertion entities are estimated to
have brought over 50% of all patent litigation in recent years.21 They have
received attention, and often criticism, from the White House, Congress,
Supreme Court Justices, Federal Circuit judges, the Federal Trade
Commission, corporations and industry groups, academics, the popular
press, and the public at large.22
Although the exact terminology and definitions vary, in rough
terms, patent assertion entities are patent holders that do not
commercialize inventions or transfer technology ex ante in a way that
helps other companies develop products. Instead, patent assertion entities
purchase patents for the purpose of extracting licensing fees by suing (or
threatening to sue) companies that have already developed products
allegedly covered by the patent.23
A vigorous debate exists within the patent community regarding
patent assertion entities. The majority view is that patent assertion
entities tax innovation, stifle research and development, enrich investors at
the expense of product-producing companies, increase litigation and
litigation costs, and bring weak claims. The minority view contends that
criticisms of patent assertion entities are overblown and unsupported
and/or that patent assertion entities are actually beneficial to innovation
by adding liquidity to the patent market and increasing the returns for
small inventors.24
The merits of this debate are complex, perhaps intractable, and
Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, at 5
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf
22 See, e.g., Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 1-2 (April 16, 2014); Executive Office of the President, Patent
Assertion and U.S. Innovation, at 2 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf; Randall R. Rader
et al., Making Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
23 Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, at 3-4
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf
24 Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 4-8 (April 16, 2014) (summarizing debate).
21
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beyond the Essay’s scope. Instead, the Essay suggests that current claim
construction rules and trends benefit, and perhaps even fuel, the patent
assertion entity business model. Those interested in reforms to restrict
patent assertion entities would be well-advised to focus at least some of
their attention on claim construction.
2. The Relationship of Patent “Trolls” to Uncertain and Broad Claim
Scope
Claim scope is central to discussions (especially criticisms) of patent
assertion entities, with patent assertion entities associated with uncertain
and broad claim scope.
First, the existence and success of patent assertion entities are
often attributed to patents with “fuzzy boundaries” and vague claims.25
Leading commentators suggest that patent assertion entities purposefully
seek out patents with vague or ambiguous claim language for purchase.26
This allows patent assertion entities to target technology that is different
than that disclosed in the patent and developed after the patent issued but
has now become firmly established and extract payments from those
dependent on a particular technology.27 Relatedly, vagueness in claim
language allows patent assertion entities to assert their patents broadly to
cover a wide range of technology that exists in the market, technology that
may only have a tangential relationship to that described in the patent.28
Importantly, technology users cannot avoid infringement before developing
or adopting a technology because the vague claim language hinders ex ante
efforts to identify or design around the subsequently asserted patent.29
Second, patent assertion entities are often said to rely on overly
broad claim scope, whether due to the inherent breadth of the patent
claims or because the ambiguity and vagueness of claim language permits
the patent assertion entity to read the claim broadly.30 Broad patent scope
allows the patent assertion entity to assert the patent against nowestablished technologies developed after the patent issued, as well as to
25 Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 9-10 (April 16, 2014).
26 James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION,
26, 26 (Winter 2011-2012).
27 James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION,
26, 26 (Winter 2011-2012); James Bessen, The patent troll crisis is really a software
patent crisis, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013).
28 James Bessen, The patent troll crisis is really a software patent crisis,
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013).
29 James Bessen, The patent troll crisis is really a software patent crisis,
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013).
30 Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, at 6
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf

22-Sep-15] PATENT “TROLLS” AND CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

9

assert it broadly against a large number of products and companies. The
result is increased returns from the patent assertion entity’s investment in
a patent.31
That patent assertion entities most commonly assert patents on
software-related inventions supports the importance of ambiguous and
broad claim scope to their business model.32 The most likely reason for the
popularity of software patents among patent assertion entities is that
software patents tend to have vague and broad claim language, often
written in “functional” terms that define a goal, rather than a specific
means of achieving that goal.33
B. Claim Construction Problems
1. The Relationship of Claim Construction and Patent Scope
The legal rights conferred by a patent are judged by the “claims” at
the end of the patent: numbered paragraphs that describe the scope of the
invention in a single, often tortuously written sentence. Like the words of
any other legal document, patent claims must be interpreted to be applied.
This process is called “claim construction” in patent lingo.
Claim
construction is widely recognized as the most important step in patent
litigation. It is a threshold step for virtually every other issue in a patent
case. And it is often case-dispositive or at least case-determinative
(limiting the issues, the range of the dispute, facilitating settlement, etc.)
because there is little dispute over the how the technology works.34
The meaning of patent claim terms, like all words, is determined by
the context in which they are used. The context for patent claim terms
includes the rest of the claim at issue, other claims in the patent, the
description of the invention in the part of the patent referred to as the
“specification,” and the record of the proceedings for obtaining the patent in
the Patent and Trademark Office. These sources of context are known as
“intrinsic evidence.” The context for patent claim terms also includes
31 James Bessen, The patent troll crisis is really a software patent crisis,
WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 3, 2013); Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion
and U.S. Innovation, at 6 (2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf
32 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 394 (2014) (noting that 62% of NPE lawsuits involve software
patents).
33 Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, at 8
(2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf; see also Mark A.
Lemley, Functional Claiming, 2013 WISCONSIN L. REV. 905.
34 Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 246, 256-257 (2014).
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information about the background meaning of the term to a skilled person
in the field (known as a “person having ordinary skill in the art” in patent
lingo), as evidenced by dictionaries, treatises, other scientific texts, other
patents, and expert testimony. These sources of context are known as
extrinsic evidence.35 The relative weight of the intrinsic context versus
extrinsic context is hotly disputed, as discussed in Part I.B.2, infra.
Claim construction is crucial to both the certainty and breadth of
patent claims. “[C]laim construction is fundamental to determining a
patent’s scope”36 because the terms in a patent claim only acquire meaning,
and therefore scope, when they are interpreted in the relevant context (i.e.,
construed). Therefore, the process for interpreting claims – what context is
consulted, in what order, for what purpose, etc. – will determine whether a
claim has broad or narrow scope.37 Likewise, the extent to which the
process for interpreting claims is well-known, predictable, and easily
replicable ex ante is a significant determinant of the certainty or
uncertainty (more accurately, predictability or unpredictability) of patent
scope.38
Unsurprisingly, uncertainty and overbreadth in patent claim scope
often are associated with claim construction problems. For example, one
commentator noted that “uncertainty over the proper procedure for claim
construction has led to uncertainty in patent scope, which in turn negates
the notice and boundary-staking functions to be performed by the patent
claim.”39 Another commentator pointed to flaws with the approach to claim
construction as the cause of problematic breadth of patent claims.40
2. Claim Construction Problems and Trends
Debates over claim construction have focused on two core problems.
First, the primary focus of commentators has been the “uncertainty”
created by the Federal Circuit’s high rate of reversal of district court claim
construction decisions.41 In previous work, I referred to the uncertainty
35 Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 257-264 (2014).
36 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2007).
37 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 103-104 (2005).
38 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 99-100 (2005).
39 Kristen Osenga, Linguistics and Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61,
64 (2006).
40 See Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2012).
41 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2007).
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created by high reversal rates as “ex post uncertainty” because it only
affected the ability to evaluate claim scope after litigation had been filed
and after the district court had issued a claim construction decision. I
argued that “ex post uncertainty” was far less significant than the difficulty
of evaluating claim scope in advance of litigation, which I called “ex ante
unpredictability.” Because the Federal Circuit’s high reversal rate had
little to no effect on ex ante predictability, I questioned the importance of
the standard of review.42
Regardless, conventional wisdom held that the Federal Circuit’s de
novo standard of claim construction review created uncertain claim scope,
with “an avalanche of critical commentary” and repeated, sharply split
Federal Circuit en banc decisions.43 Ultimately, the Supreme Court in
Teva v. Sandoz held that the Federal Circuit must review the “evidentiary
underpinnings” of claim construction for “clear error,” rather than de
novo.44
The second major problem with claim construction – a deep and
persistent split within the precedent as to the proper approach to claim
construction – has received comparatively less attention than the standard
of review. Yet, because it directly affects ex ante predictability of claim
Although variably described,
scope, it is far more important.45
commentators generally agree there are two identifiable and conflicting
methodological approaches. The primary difference between the two
approaches is to what extent claim construction should rely on the written
description of the invention found in the patent specification and to what
extent it should rely on the background or general meaning of the claim
term in the field of invention. Put another way, the split is over what
constitutes the primary context for understanding patent claim terms: the
patent itself or the background or general knowledge in the field.46
The first claim construction methodology, which I call the “general
meaning” approach (and others refer to as the “heavy presumption” or
“procedural” approach), emphasizes the background or general meaning in
42 Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong
Claim Construction Issue for En Banc Review, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43, 47-48
(2013).
43 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1034 (2007); see also Lighting Ballast
Control v. Philips Electronics, 744 F. 3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
44 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015).
45 Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong
Claim Construction Issue for En Banc Review, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43 (2013).
46 For a more detailed description and analysis of the methodological split, see Greg
Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary Reader
Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 246-248, 256-266 (2014), upon
which the following paragraphs rely.
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the field, with only a limited role for the specification to alter this meaning.
Under this approach, claim construction begins with a “heavy
presumption” in favor of the “general,” “plain,” and or “ordinary” meaning
of the claim term to a skilled person in the field. Although not explicitly
stated, this general meaning is presumably identified through extrinsic
evidence of the understanding in the field, such as expert testimony,
dictionaries, or scientific texts. Claim construction then turns to the
specification to see if the patentee varied this general meaning.
Importantly, this approach severely limits variance from the general
meaning, permitting a “quite narrow” exception to general meaning only if
the specification meets an “exacting standard.” Specifically, the patentee
must have “clearly set forth” an express definition different from the
general meaning or used “expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction”
that clearly and unmistakably disclaimed claim scope.47
The second approach to claim construction, which I call the “patentfocused approach” (and others refer to as the “Phillips,” “Vitronics,” or
“holistic” approach) emphasizes the meaning that the claim term bears in
the patent itself, regardless of the meaning it would generally have in the
field of the invention. A claim term’s meaning is primarily derived by the
contextual clues provided in the specification, which can define a claim
term explicitly or implicitly. Extrinsic evidence can provide useful
background information to understand the specification but cannot support
a claim interpretation broader than that suggested by the specification.48
The Federal Circuit’s 2006 en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH
Corp. seemed to resolve the methodological split in favor of a patentfocused approach.49 Unfortunately, empirical evidence demonstrates that
the Federal Circuit’s precedent remains as divided on claim construction
methodology as before Phillips.50 Despite Phillips’ fairly clear endorsement
of a patent-focused approach, “courts have quietly been shifting back
towards a ‘heavy presumption of ordinary meaning’ . . . with only limited
Recent examples of this approach include: Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent’mt
Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J. dissenting from the
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc). For further description of this approach,
see Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 262-263 (2014).
48 An example of this approach is Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582-83 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For further description of this approach, see Greg Reilly,
Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary Reader Standard, 20
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 263-264 (2014).
49 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
50 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh
ed., 2013).
47
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exceptions when there has been lexicography or an express disclaimer,” a
“trend [that] has been largely without fanfare.”51
The methodological split is not just a matter of semantics. Federal
Circuit judges acknowledge a “fundamental split within the court as
to . . . the proper approach to claim interpretation.”52 Empirical evidence
confirms that the outcome of claim construction appeals depends on the
methodological preference of the panel of Federal Circuit judges and that
most disputes over claim construction result from disagreements over
methodology. Specifically, 95% of splits within Federal Circuit panels and
75-82% of Federal Circuit reversals of district court claim constructions
result from differences in the methodological approach applied.53
C. The Disconnect Between Patent “Troll” Debates and Claim
Construction Debates
The role of claim construction has been largely absent from debates
over patent assertion entities. Claim construction reform is not on the
agenda for current patent reform efforts focused on combatting patent
assertion entities.54 Instead, reform proposals treat claim construction as
part of the solution to current patent issues. Patent reform legislation
would import the process for claim construction used in the district courts –
long bemoaned by commentators – into U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”) proceedings where the validity of the patent is challenged after the
patent has been issued by the PTO.55 Other patent reform proposals would
stay almost all discovery until after claim construction, on the assumption
that claim construction will successfully weed out frivolous or weak claims
brought by patent assertion entities.56
Even though claim construction has previously been blamed for
uncertain and broad claim scope, claim construction is rarely mentioned as
a way to reduce the uncertainty and breadth of claim scope in order to
address the patent assertion entity “problem.” The most popular proposals
focus on strengthening the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 that the claims
51 Steven C. Carlson & Uttam G. Dubal, Federal Circuit Boosts Patent Owners on
Claim Construction, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Oct. 9, 2013).
52 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (Moore, J. dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
53 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1143-44, 116370 (2004).
54 Patent Progress’s Guide to Federal Patent Reform Legislation, available at
http://www.patentprogress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresssguide-patent-reform-legislation/ (last visited May, 30, 2015).
55 Innovation Act, H.R. 9, § 9(b) (114th Cong., 1st Session).
56 Innovation Act, H.R. 9, § 3(d) (114th Cong., 1st Session); PATENT Act, S. 1137,
§ 5 (114th Cong., 1st Session).
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be “definite” and that the patent include a “written description”
demonstrating that the patentee possessed the invention at the time of
filing and an enabling disclosure that permits a skilled person in the field
to make and use the invention.57 Other proposals include reducing the
ability of patentees to hide or delay patent applications in the Patent and
Trademark Office58 and including glossaries of key claim terms within the
patent.59 Claim construction, however, has been ignored. To the contrary,
overestimating the impact of Phillips v. AWH Corp. in resolving the
Federal Circuit’s methodological split, the Federal Trade Commission
concluded that current claim construction doctrine “marks a beneficial step
from the perspective of public notice.”60
The connection between patent assertion entities and claim
construction has been recognized in the limited context of interpreting
functional claims in software patents.61 Professor Mark Lemley has
suggested a particular solution to the problem of functional claiming in
software patents by interpreting functional claims as limited to the means
for implementing the function described in the patent.62 In essence, the
proposal would except functional claims in software patents from normal
claim construction rules and create special claim construction rules specific
to software functional claims, rules that are essentially a strong version of
the patent-focused approach. Professor Lemley and others seem to assume
that the problem with functional software claims results from the inherent
indeterminacy of software claims, rather than the problems with the claim
construction process addressed in this Essay.63
Thus, the role of claim construction issues in facilitating the patent
assertion entity business model is an important issue that has been largely
absent from debates over patent assertion entities. The converse is also
true. The beneficial effects for patent assertion entities have been largely
overlooked in the claim construction debates.

57 Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 17 (April 16, 2014).
58 Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 17 (April 16, 2014).
59 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 110 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
60 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 102 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
61 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 394 (2014).
62 Mark A. Lemley, Functional Claiming, 2013 WISCONSIN L. REV. 905.
63 Mark A. Lemley, Functional Claiming, 2013 WISCONSIN L. REV. 905, 919-928
(suggesting problem with software claims comes primarily from nature of software and
nature of claim drafting).
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II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS AND TRENDS HAVE, AND WILL,
BENEFIT PATENT “TROLLS”
This Part turns to the intersection of the parallel debates over
patent assertion entities and claim construction explored in Part I. Patent
assertion entities benefit from three major problems in claim construction:
the methodological split, the continued vitality of the general meaning
approach, and the appellate standard of review. Surprisingly, while the
general tide of patent law moves to limit and undermine patent assertion
entities, claim construction trends are unwittingly moving in the opposite
direction, i.e., in ways favorable to patent assertion entities.
A. The Claim Construction Split, Uncertainty, and Patent
Assertion Entities
1. How the Claim Construction Split Benefits Patent Assertion Entities
In theory, competitors and the public should be able to “understand
what is the scope of the patent owner’s rights by obtaining the patent and
prosecution history . . . and applying established rules of construction” and
“be able to rest assured . . . that a judge . . . will similarly analyze the text
of the patent and its associated public record and apply the established
rules of construction.”64 However, the Federal Circuit’s split over the
proper approach to claim construction makes it difficult to “understand
what is the scope of the patent owner’s rights” for two reasons.
First, there are no “established rules of construction.” Rather, there
are two competing sets of rules for construction. One set of rules starts
with a presumption in favor of the extrinsic, general meaning of the term
in the field and only looks to the use in the patent itself for a clear and
unmistakable rebuttal of this presumption. The other set of rules starts
with the usage of the term in the patent itself and only looks to extrinsic
usage to help clarify the intrinsic usage. The scope of the patentee’s rights
depends on the choice between these two sets of rules.65 However, a
competitor has no reliable basis on which to choose between them, as both
have significant precedential support.66
64 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 978-979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff’d 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
65 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1170 (2004)
(‘The Federal Circuit's claim construction jurisprudence evinces a distinct split in
methodological approach, a dichotomy that both involves a significant number of
decisions and appears to affect the results of the cases.”).
66 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and
Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 100 (2005) (“With only one
methodology used, different individuals more likely will interpret the claims in the
same manner, and thus, a higher likelihood of getting a similar result will exist.”).
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Second, competitors cannot “rest assured . . . that a judge . . . will
similarly analyze” the claim terms. If a competitor chooses to act based on
a certain understanding of claim scope derived using one of the existing
methodological approaches, it cannot predict that an unknown judge
construing the claims in an unknown litigation will adopt the same
Different judges take different approaches to claim
approach.67
construction and, often, even the same judge will take different approaches
to claim construction from case to case.68
In this way, the Federal Circuit’s split over the proper approach to
claim construction is a contributor to the uncertainty of patent scope,
perhaps a significant contributor.
As one commentator explained,
“[r]egardless of a methodology’s specifics, an inherent certainty [would be]
created once courts decide on a single methodology.”69 There is near
universal agreement that uncertain patent scope is a significant factor in
the rise and success of patent assertion entities – a conclusion endorsed by
the Federal Trade Commission,70 Congressional Research Service,71 White
House,72 academics,73 and technology companies.74 If uncertain patent
scope is a major factor fueling patent assertion entities and the Federal
Circuit’s split over the proper claim construction approach is a major cause
of uncertain patent scope, the Federal Circuit’s continued claim
construction split inures to the benefit of patent assertion entities.
I do not suggest that the Federal Circuit’s claim construction split is
the sole cause of the uncertain patent scope on which patent assertion
entities prey. Other factors are certainly at play, including “continuation”
See Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and
Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 99 (2005) (“Without clear
direction from the courts in the form of a single methodology, one cannot predict a
claim's meaning because of the uncertainty about which methodology will be used.”).
68 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1143-44, 116370 (2004) (concluding that “[t]he methodological approaches of individual judges on the
Federal Circuit vary widely” and that “most Federal Circuit judges have relatively
similar levels of inconsistency in claim construction methodology, but a small group is
substantially more consistent”).
69 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 99 (2005).
70 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 9 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
71 Brian T. Yeh, An Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE 9 (April 16, 2014).
72 Executive Office of the President, Patent Assertion and U.S. Innovation, at 4
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf
73 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 387, 393-394 (2014).
74 Comments of Google Inc., In re: Strategies for Improving Claim Clarity: Glossary
Use in Defining Claim Terms, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 5 (Oct. 23, 2013).
67
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practice at the Patent Office that allows patentees to write claims to cover
later developments in the market, the inherent indeterminacy of language
(or at least of describing software inventions in written words), and
perhaps the indefiniteness doctrine.75 Professor Lemley is undoubtedly
correct that widespread use of functional claiming – which defines the
invention by what it does, not how it does it – in software patents is a
major contributor to the patent “thicket” that undermines public notice.76
And, as explained in Part II.B, infra, the actual content of claim
construction rules contribute to uncertain patent scope.77 My claim is more
modest: there is an important connection between the claim construction
split and patent assertion entities that is being overlooked in both the
debates over claim construction and the debates over patent assertion
entities.
2. How Current Trends Benefit Patent Assertion Entities
To some extent, it is difficult to identify any “trend” in the case law
and commentary related to the Federal Circuit’s claim construction split
for the simple reason that the Federal Circuit has been significantly
divided for a decade and a half.78 Empirical evidence indicates that
Federal Circuit opinions in the years immediately after 2005’s Phillips v.
AWH Corp., where the en banc court addressed the proper methodological
approach, were as divided on methodology as they were before.79 Anecdotal
accounts offer a more complex story in which early decisions after Phillips
largely followed a single, patent-focused methodology, with a more recent
rise in the “general meaning” approach returning the Federal Circuit’s
claim construction doctrine to the same split that existed before Phillips.80
Regardless of whether the Federal Circuit is becoming more divided
or is simply as divided as ever, the existence and importance of the Federal
Circuit’s methodological split is increasingly ignored or downplayed. PostPhillips, attention to the split over claim construction probably peaked in
75 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 9 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
76 Mark A. Lemley, Functional Claiming, 2013 WISCONSIN L. REV. 905.
77 See also Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and
Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 99 (2005). (“The methodology
chosen can still be unpredictable in application because of the canons it chooses to
use.”).
78 See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1,
5 (2000) (describing split between what the author labeled “pragmatic textualism” and
“hyper textualism”).
79 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, 133-135 (S. Balganesh, ed., 2013) (finding “virtually
no change” in methodological split after Phillips through 2007).
80 Steven Carlson & Uttam Dubal, Federal Circuit Boosts Patent Owners on Claim
Construction, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Oct. 9, 2013).
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2011 with a vigorous dissent from the Federal Circuit’s denial of rehearing
en banc identifying “a fundamental split within the court as to . . . the
proper approach to claim interpretation.”81 However, the Federal Circuit’s
methodological split is increasingly absent from patent debates. For
example, in briefing to the Supreme Court in Nautilus v. Biosig, the
indefiniteness doctrine at issue in that case was blamed for uncertain
patent scope, with the role of claim construction and the claim construction
split ignored.82 Moreover, in reactions to the Supreme Court’s adoption of a
more deferential standard of review for claim construction in Teva v.
Sandoz, commentators have described the Federal Circuit as having a
singular “established methodology for construing claims,”83 overlooking the
deep methodological split that Professors Wagner and Petherbridge
empirically reconfirmed only a year before Teva.84
Two leading
commentators even hope that Teva solved long-standing claim construction
problems, optimistically suggesting that implementation of Teva could
result in “effective, transparent, and well-reasoned patent claim
constructions” and that “patent litigation will become more predictable and
understandable.”85 Again, the methodological split and its contribution to
uncertain patent scope are overlooked
Downplaying or ignoring the Federal Circuit’s split over the proper
approach to claim construction is good for patent assertion entities. Patent
assertion entities benefit from the uncertain claim scope resulting from the
absence of a single approach to claim construction. The longer the Federal
Circuit’s split persists, the better for patent assertion entities’ prospects.
And the less attention the split receives, the longer it is likely to remain.
Unsurprisingly, the patent stakeholders actually focused on the connection
between the methodological split, uncertain patent scope, and patent
assertion entities are the major technology companies most frequently
targeted by patent assertion entities.86

81 Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (Moore, J. dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc).
82 Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1353 (2014).
83 Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD
TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 19-22).
84 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, 144-145 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013).
85 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Restoring the Fact/Law Distinction in
Patent Claim Construction, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 187, 198 (2015).
86 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 20-22, 2627, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015)
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B. The General Meaning Approach, Unpredictability,
Overbreadth, and Patent Assertion Entities
1. How the General Meaning Approach Benefits Patent Assertion Entities
Beyond the mere existence of a split over claim construction
approach, the content of claim construction rules also affect the prospects
for patent assertion entities. Different approaches to claim construction
differ in the degree of predictability and breadth of claim scope they
produce.87 For reasons previously explained, patent assertion entities
prefer a claim construction approach that tends to produce less predictable
and broader claim scope.88 The “general meaning” approach to claim
construction – where claim construction starts with extrinsic sources as to
the abstract meaning in the field of invention and only looks to the
specification for a clear deviation from this abstract meaning – does exactly
that. As a result, its continued support within the claim construction
precedent helps patent assertion entities.
Some scholars believe that the general meaning approach results in
more predictable claim scope.89 They assume that skilled people can
simply apply their own understanding of the claim term – an
understanding that reflects the general understanding in the field – with
confidence that the claim construction adopted in subsequent litigation will
reflect this understanding.90 While theoretically sound, this represents an
idealized view of actual litigation. The incentives in litigation are likely to
result in a battle of experts (or expert texts) each asserting a “general
meaning” that is most favorable to its side’s litigation position, regardless
of any connection to any actual “general meaning” in the field (to the extent
one even exists).91 Nor are generalist judges well-situated to sort through
the ex post, litigation-driven “general meanings” and accurately identify
the true “general meaning” in the field.92
Anecdotal evidence from those on the ground confirms that scholars
Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 100 (2005).
88 See Part II.A.2, supra.
89 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, 144-145 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013).
90 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, 144-145 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013).
91 Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 271-277 (2014).
92 Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 271-277 (2014).
87
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are overly optimistic when they assume the “general meaning” approach
promotes predictability of claim scope. The Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) surveyed a wide range of stakeholders within the patent system,
finding, among other things, that there was widespread concern about
uncertain patent scope, especially in the information technology sector.
Importantly, though, the FTC noted that “[t]hose who found claim
construction manageable emphasized the importance of looking beyond the
claims themselves and relying heavily on review of the patent’s description
of the invention to sort out claim meaning.”93 A group of the nation’s
leading information technology companies – the industry in which patent
notice problems are widely agreed to be most severe94 – concur: “[d]ecisions
that divorce claim terms from the context of the written description
entrench claim ambiguity and litigation uncertainty.”95
The patent-focused approach encourages heavy reliance on the
specification to understand claim meaning, whereas the “general meaning”
approach limits reliance on the specification to explicit definitions or clear
disclaimers of claim scope. “From a notice perspective,” the patent-focused
approach “works best.”96 As the FTC explained, when claim construction is
primarily driven by the patent itself, “[a] third party seeking to understand
a claim’s meaning can view the intrinsic evidence by reading the patent
and consulting the file wrapper (containing the prosecution history). The
material is easily identifiable by, and accessible to, third parties” ex ante.97
By contrast, when claim construction emphasizes the supposed “general
meaning” in the technical field, claim meaning depends on external texts
and expert testimony identified or developed ex post for purposes of
litigation. “A third party therefore cannot know in advance what external
evidence will be utilized” because there are a variety of potential external
texts or expert witnesses which will support a variety of supposed “general
Thus, the patent-focused approach better promotes
meanings.”98
predictability of claim scope, whereas the general meaning approach
93 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 82 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
94 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 80 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]; Brian T. Yeh, An
Overview of the Patent “Troll” Debates, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 9 (April 16,
2014).
95 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Lighting
Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en
banc) (joined by Google, Amazon, HP, Red Hat, and Yahoo!).
96 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 102 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
97 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 102 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
98 FED. TRADE COMM’N., THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE &
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 102 & n.181 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT] (quoting
stakeholder as saying that “if you start to look at external records, even in biotech,
there you can probably find five different people to say five different things”).
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increases the unpredictability of claim scope upon which patent assertion
entities rely.99
The different claim construction methodologies also produce
different claim scope. Specifically, the general meaning approach will tend
to produce broader claim scope than the patent-focused approach.100 Even
those generally supportive of the general meaning approach acknowledge
that it is likely to “yield broader interpretations.”101 This is because the
patent-focused approach limits the context available for claim construction
to that found in the patent itself. “The patent’s disclosure sets a ceiling for
the claim’s meaning, and thus, the literal scope of exclusivity afforded to
the patent.”102 By contrast, the general meaning approach “moves the
claim term’s meaning from the context of the patent to the abstract,” which
will naturally expand the potential claim scope.103 The specification does
not generally limit claim scope under this approach.104 Rather, the only
limit on claim scope is the ability to find some expert text, however
tangentially relevant, or some paid expert witness to support a supposed
“general meaning.”105
Thus, the general meaning approach to claim construction produces
unpredictable and broad claim scope, the very conditions in which patent
assertion entities thrive.106 Unsurprisingly, in litigation, patent assertion
99 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 21, Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015) (endorsing patentfocused approach and rejecting general meaning approach based on certainty concerns).
100 Steven C. Carlson & Uttam G. Dubal, Federal Circuit Boosts Patent Owners on
Claim Construction, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Oct. 9, 2013) (noting that
claims are “overwhelmingly construed broadly” under the general meaning approach,
which authors refer to as “heavy presumption of ordinary meaning” standard);
Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their Claim
Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 121-122 (2005) (noting that the “heavy
presumption,” i.e., general meaning, methodology may give the patentee “the greatest
possible breadth of patent protection”).
101 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1142 (2004)
(referring to “general meaning” approach as “procedural methodology”); see also
Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Moore, J. dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc)
(acknowledging that the “general meaning” approach can produce claim scope broader
than a patent-focused approach but arguing that this is a problem of invalidity).
102 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 108 (2005).
103 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 114 (2005).
104 Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies and Their
Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 110 (2005).
105 Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An Ordinary
Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243, 276-277 (2014).
106 See Part I.A.2, supra.
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entities often rely on the general meaning approach in formulating claim
construction positions. As one practitioner explained, “[w]hen the claim
construction phase occurs, the claim construction proposed by plaintiff in
such [patent “troll”] cases is typically superficial, often consisting of ‘no
construction required,’ ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ or ‘dictionary
definition,’ with the goal a construction that results in infringement with
some wiggle room to avoid prior art.”107 Two other practitioners concluded
that “[p]atent trolls excel[] under this [general meaning] standard, with
infringement easier to prove, and patent invalidity always an elusive and
risky path.”108 Probably for these exact reasons, the most common targets
of patent assertion entities – the nation’s leading technology companies –
vehemently rejected the general meaning approach and endorsed the
patent-focused approach, arguing that “[i]t is improper to ignore the
specification in favor of a ‘plain meaning’ analysis divorced from the
context of the patent.”109
2. How Current Trends Benefit Patent Assertion Entities
Even as the patent community is increasingly obsessed by how to
combat patent assertion entities, the claim construction case law and
scholarship are moving in favor of patent assertion entity’s preferred claim
construction methodology: the general meaning approach.
The case law long has been split between the “general meaning”
and patent-focused approaches, a split that Professors Wagner and
Petherbridge found to have remained fairly consistent after the Federal
Circuit’s 2005 Phillips decision, at least through 2007 (the end of their
study).110 However, anecdotal reports suggest that in the past few years
“claim construction law for now is swinging in the direction” of the “general
meaning” approach, with more cases taking this approach than before and
the newer Federal Circuit judges favoring it.111 Moreover, although the
Supreme Court’s decision in Teva v. Sandoz addressed the standard of
Christopher Hu, 26 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL No. 8,
at 1, 3 (2014).
108 Steven C. Carlson & Uttam G. Dubal, Federal Circuit Boosts Patent Owners on
Claim Construction, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Oct. 9, 2013) (referring to
“general meaning” approach as “heavy presumption” methodology).
109 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 21-22, Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015) (joined by Google, Dell,
HP, Salesforce.com, Twitter, Yahoo!, Acushnet, eBay, Kaspersky Lab, Limelight
Networks, Newegg, QVC, SAS Institute, and Xilink)
110 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, 134-135 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013)
111 Steven C. Carlson & Uttam G. Dubal, Federal Circuit Boosts Patent Owners on
Claim Construction, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Oct. 9, 2013).
107
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appellate review, not methodology, for claim construction, the Court did
endorse district court’s “consult[ing] extrinsic evidence in order to
understand . . . the meaning of a term in the relevant art during the
relevant time period.”112 Some scholars have read this as consistent with
an approach to claim construction that starts with extrinsic evidence about
the meaning of the term in the field and only then checks to see if the
intrinsic evidence is inconsistent with this meaning, i.e., an approach
similar to the general meaning approach.113
Teva could result in greater use of the “general meaning” approach
for an additional reason. Under Teva, district courts receive deference for
findings on subsidiary factual issues underpinning claim construction, such
as the general meaning of the term in the technical field or resolution of
conflicting expert testimony, but no deference when claim construction is
based solely on the intrinsic evidence within the patent document and
prosecution history.114 This gives district judges incentives to rely heavily
on extrinsic evidence and expert testimony – such as by using the general
meaning approach, not the patent-focused approach – in order to insure
deferential review from the Federal Circuit.115 On the other hand, the
incentive Teva provides district courts to use the general meaning
approach may be counterbalanced by the incentive it provides the Federal
Circuit to emphasize greater or exclusive use of the intrinsic record –
consistent with the patent-focused approach – so as to avoid having to defer
to district court claim constructions.116
Beyond the case law, claim construction scholarship increasingly
favors the “general meaning” approach. In the past, the scholarship, like
the case law, was divided between the patent-focused and general meaning
approaches.117 However, recent work from leading scholars endorses, to
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 840-842 (2015).
Dennis Crouch, Giving Deference to the Supreme Court in Teva v. Sandoz,
PATENTLYO (Jan. 21, 2015), available at http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/deferencesupreme-sandoz.html (quoting Professor Rantanen but noting that other commentators
disagreed); Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD
TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 25); see also J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell,
Restoring the Fact/Law Distinction in Patent Claim Construction, 109 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 187, 198 (2015) (arguing that Teva “affords [district courts] greater flexibility to
use familiar tools for resolving factual disputes—presentation of [extrinsic] evidence
and expert testimony”).
114 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 841 (2015).
115 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 23, Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015).
116 Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD
TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 19-22) (suggesting that this has been Federal
Circuit’s reaction to Teva).
117 Compare, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation
Methodologies and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49 (2005)
(endorsing patent-focused approach); Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form
112
113
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varying extents, approaches to claim construction more consistent with the
general meaning approach than the patent-focused approach. Professors
Wagner and Petherbridge explicitly endorse “[a]n approach to patent claim
construction that firmly embraces the commonly understood meaning of
words and places the burden on the patent applicant to clearly explain any
deviations from the ordinary meaning” and reject “an open-ended search
for ‘contextual’ meaning in the patent document and prosecution
history.”118 Similarly, Professor Rantanen advocates “a claim construction
process where the judge begins by making a factual determination about
the meaning of a claim term to a person of skill in the art [using extrinsic
evidence] and then considers the intrinsic evidence of the patent to arrive
at a legal conclusion as to its meaning in the patent.”119 Professor Crouch
believes that “the rule that extrinsic evidence is of secondary importance
and perhaps should not be considered absent ambiguity in the intrinsic
evidence . . . is contrary to the rule that the interpretation should be based
upon the contemporary understanding of a person having ordinary skill in
the art.”120 And Professors Anderson and Menell criticize relying just on
the intrinsic evidence and instead endorse an approach that “place[s]
greater emphasis on skilled artisans, inventors, patent attorneys, and
patent agents in tracing the drafting of patent claim terms and their
understanding to skilled artisans in the context of the particular patent.”121
The recent cases and scholarship favoring the general meaning
approach to claim construction seem not to appreciate the beneficial effects
this approach has for patent assertion entities. This trend is again
inconsistent with the general tide of patent law, which aims to reduce the
prevalence and power of patent assertion entities.

& Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333 (2007) (same); with, e.g.,
Kristen Osenga, Linguistics & Patent Claim Construction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 61 (2006)
(endorsing approach more similar to “general meaning” approach); R. Polk Wagner &
Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of
Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (same).
118 R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Did Phillips Change Anything? Empirical
Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction Jurisprudence, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & THE COMMON LAW 123, 143-145 (Shyamkrishna
Balganesh ed., 2013).
119 Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD
TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 22-25).
120 Dennis Crouch, Teva v. Sandoz: Partial Deference in Claim Construction,
PATENTLYO (Jan. 20, 2015), available at http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/partialdeference-construction.html.
121 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
68, 75 (2013).
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C. The Standard of Review, Forum Choice, and Patent Assertion
Entities
1. How Deferential Review Benefits Patent Assertion Entities
The appropriate appellate standard of review for claim construction
– the Federal Circuit’s long-standing de novo standard or some more
deferential standard – has received extensive attention over the past
fifteen years.122 Despite the volumes of ink spilled, there has been little
development of the connection between the standard of review and patent
assertion entities.
If anything, the ubiquitous assertion that more
deferential review will increase certainty of patent scope123 could suggest
that deferential review will undermine patent assertion entities.
As I have explained elsewhere, more deferential appellate review of
claim construction is unlikely to have a significant impact on certainty of
claim scope.124 Deferential review may improve to some extent the ex post
certainty of claim construction after the district court has issued its claim
construction. Even this is unlikely to be significant as long as the
methodological split exists because the district judge’s choice of
methodology is a question of law subject to de novo review, even if the
underlying claim construction is reviewed deferentially. More importantly,
deferential appellate review has no impact on the far more important
question of ex ante predictability, i.e., whether claim scope can accurately
be predicted in advance of litigation. Thus, the likelihood that deferential
review of claim construction will improve predictability of claim scope in a
way that will affect patent assertion entities is low.
On the other hand, in two ways, deferential review of claim
construction is likely to benefit patent assertion entities. First, as
discussed in Part II.B.2, supra, deferential review incentivizes district
judges to place greater reliance on the general meaning approach to claim
construction and extrinsic evidence more generally.125 The result is likely
to be greater uncertainty and breadth of claim scope, the exact conditions
in which patent assertion entities thrive.126
See Part I.B.2, supra.
See Part I.B.2, supra.
124 Greg Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong
Claim Construction Issue for En Banc Review, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43 (2013).
125 See also J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
68, 75 (2013) (endorsing deferential review exactly because it will lead to greater
emphasis on extrinsic texts and expert witnesses); Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and
Change Without Change, __ STANFORD TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 22-25)
(hoping that deferential review will lead to this result).
126 See Part II.B.1, supra. This is true unless the incentives the Federal Circuit has
to emphasize the intrinsic record, so as to increase its ability to review claim
122
123

26

91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)

[22-Sep-15

Second, the more deferential standard of review provides greater
power and discretion to the district judge.127 Some may see this as a
benefit of deferential review, as the Federal Circuit is often seen as too
powerful and self-aggrandizing.128 Similarly, some may believe that
deferential review, and therefore less power for the Federal Circuit, will
undermine patent assertion entities, since the Federal Circuit is often seen
as pro-patentee.129 However, empirical evidence demonstrates that, at
least in recent years, the Federal Circuit used its de novo review power to
the detriment of patentees. Professor Cotropia’s study of Federal Circuit
claim construction decisions between 2010 and 2013 found that “[l]ower
court decisions where the patentee wins are more likely to be subject to a
claim construction reversal that prompts a change in the case’s outcome,”
whereas “in cases where the patentee loses below . . . the claim
These effects were
construction affirmance rate is the highest.”130
strongest “in cases involving electronic, information technology, or business
method patents,”131 the very areas in which patent assertion entities are
most prevalent.
Thus, assuming more deferential review of claim
construction results in fewer reversals, patentees, especially patent
assertion entities, will benefit, since reversals under de novo review were
concentrated in cases where the patentee won below in the technical areas
where patent assertion entities are the most active.
This potential result of deferential review is exacerbated by the
increasing recognition that judges in certain districts, especially the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, seek to attract patent
litigation by distorting their decisions in favor of the patentee (who chooses
the forum), or “forum selling.”132 As a result, 29% of 2014 patent cases
construction de novo under Teva, leads it to resolve the claim construction spilt in favor
of the patent-only approach. See id.
127 Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law (June 2015 manuscript at
37), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2616412 (describing how Teva
and other Supreme Court decisions “elevat[e] districts courts and the PTO in influence
relative to the Federal Circuit”).
128 Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law (June 2015 manuscript at
37), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2616412 (describing how
Federal Circuit “tends to enhance its own power” and how de novo review of claim
construction “allowed the Federal Circuit to assume greater power over a crucial aspect
of patent litigation”).
129 Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law (June 2015 manuscript at
37), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2616412 (describing Federal
Circuit as “a pro-patent institution”).
130 Christopher A. Cotropia, Is Patent Claim Interpretation Deference or Correction
Driven?, 2014 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (Feb. 7, 2014 manuscript at 4),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2265962.
131 Christopher A. Cotropia, Is Patent Claim Interpretation Deference or Correction
Driven?, 2014 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (Feb. 7, 2014 manuscript at 4),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2265962.
132 J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PENN. L. REV.
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were filed in the Eastern District of Texas,133 as were an astounding 44% of
patent cases filed in the first half of 2015.134 Patent assertion entities in
particular prefer to litigate in the Eastern District of Texas.135 To date, the
Eastern District’s primary means for attracting patent cases has been propatentee procedures.136 However, increased deference to district court
claim construction decisions makes substantive differences between
districts on claim construction more important, as they would be more
likely to withstand appellate scrutiny. This will provide even greater
incentives for patentees, including patent assertion entities, to file in the
districts most favorable to them.137 It also could incentivize the Eastern
District of Texas, and other forum selling districts, to compete for patentees
by offering them even more favorable (likely broader) claim construction
decisions.138
Rough empirical evidence suggests that the Eastern District of
Texas already does so.139 The leading, or perhaps most extreme, example
of the general meaning approach favored by patent assertion entities was
Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,140 a decision subsequently
631(2015); Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857.
133 Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857.
134 Brian Howard, 2015 First Half Patent Case Filing Trends, LEXMACHINA (July
14, 2015), https://lexmachina.com/2015-first-half-patent-case-filing-trends/ (finding
1387 of 3122 patent cases filed in first half of 2015 were filed in Eastern District of
Texas).
135 Government Accounting Office, Assessing Factors That Affect Patent
Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent Quality, Report No. GAO-13-465, at
24 (Aug. 2013) (finding that patent assertion entities “filed more lawsuits in the
Eastern District of Texas than other types of plaintiffs” and that 39% of their cases
were filed there compared to 8% of cases filed by other types of plaintiffs).
136 Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857.
137 Brief for Intel Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015) (suggesting that patent
assertion entities are “especially likely to exploit forum-shopping opportunities” created
by deferential review of claim construction).
138 Cf. J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
68, 75 (2013) (noting argument that de novo review could control “renegade districts”
but rejecting it because Eastern District of Texas does not have unusual reversal rate
compared to other districts).
139 This is a quick study, not a comprehensive analysis. It shares the problems of
any study relying on decisions reported on Westlaw or Lexis. Moreover, it does not
address for what purpose the cases were cited or their effects on outcomes; for example,
the Eastern District may be citing Texas Digital for a basic point of law not renounced
in Phillips.
140 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent
Hermeneutics: Form & Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 354
(2007).
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“renounced”141 (even if not formally overruled) by the en banc Federal
Circuit’s 2005 Phillips decision.142 The leading example of the patentfocused approach is probably Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., a
decision that was expressly reaffirmed by Phillips.143 Unsurprisingly given
their relative precedential status, Phillips was cited nine times more
frequently than Texas Digital nationwide from 2006-2013 and Vitronics six
times more frequently than Texas Digital. But in the Eastern District of
Texas, Phillips was cited only four times more frequently than Texas
Digital and Vitronics only three times more frequently than Texas
Digital.144 Thus, while the Eastern District cites Phillips and Vitronics at
rates comparable to elsewhere, it cites the patent-assertion-entity-friendly
Texas Digital general meaning decision far more frequently than normal.145
This is consistent with, though hardly dispositive of, a conclusion that the
Eastern District of Texas’ claim construction decisions benefit patent
assertion entities, decisions that are more likely to withstand appellate
scrutiny under deferential review.
On the other hand, Professors Anderson and Menell found that the
Eastern District of Texas does not fare worse on appellate review of claim
construction than other districts. For that reason, they rejected any
concern that deferential review of claim construction was problematic in
light of the existence of “renegade” districts like the Eastern District of
Texas.146 While interesting, it is difficult to know how much weight to give
to appellate reversal rates in evaluating the Eastern District’s
performance, given the existence of significant selection effects regarding
the cases that reach final decision and are appealed.147 More importantly,
141 Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form & Substance in Claim
Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 358 (2007).
142 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
143 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form
& Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 362 (2007).
144 Phillips was issued, and Texas Digital renounced and Vitronics reaffirmed, on
July 12, 2005. My study started with January 1, 2006 to allow district courts to adjust
to Phillips. Citations were calculated via Westlaw by entering the citation for each
decision; clicking on the “Citing References” function; limiting to cases; limiting to Jan.
1, 2006-Dec. 31, 2013; limiting to district courts; limiting by “hide negative.” For each
decision, citations were then limited just to E.D. Tex and again limited to hide negative.
Nationwide, there were 2832 cites to Phillips, 1995 cites to Vitronics, and 328 cites to
Texas Digital. In the Eastern District of Texas, there were 437 cites to Phillips, 312
cites to Vitronics, and 107 cites to Texas Digital.
145 According to Lex Machina, 16.7% of claim construction orders from 2006-2013
were from the Eastern District of Texas. 15.4% of non-negative citations to Phillips and
15.6% of non-negative citations to Vitronics were from the Eastern District, but 32.6%
of non-negative citations to Texas Digital were from the Eastern District. See id.
146 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
68, 70 (2013).
147 For example, the Eastern District of Texas grants summary judgment at
approximately one-fourth the rate of other districts. This means that obtaining an
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even if the Eastern District of Texas has not skewed claim construction in a
pro-patentee direction in the past – perhaps because of the threat of
reversal under de novo review – deferential review after Teva gives it
greater opportunity and incentive to do so in the future.
Thus, deferential review of claim construction is unlikely to reduce
uncertainty in a way that will affect patent assertion entities. By contrast,
it is likely to increase use of patent-assertion-entity friendly general
meaning approach, as well as increase the power and importance of the
district courts most favorable to patent assertion entities. Overall,
deferential review of claim construction is good news for patent assertion
entities. Unsurprisingly, the nation’s leading technology companies (again,
the most popular target of patent assertion entities) bucked conventional
wisdom in recent years and argued for retention of the Federal Circuit’s de
novo review standard.148
2. How Current Trends Benefit Patent Assertion Entities
Claim construction is undoubtedly moving in favor of more
deferential appellate review. Again, this trend is out of step with general
concerns about the effect of patent assertion entities on the patent system.
In Teva v. Sandoz, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s
de novo standard of review, holding instead that some measure of
deference was appropriate in reviewing district court claim construction
decisions. Specifically, the Court held that a district court’s “subsidiary
factual findings about th[e] extrinsic evidence . . . must be reviewed for
clear error on appeal,” though the Federal Circuit should “still review the
district court's ultimate construction of the claim de novo.”149 “On its face,
Teva v. Sandoz unquestionably altered the standard of review for claim
construction, shifting it towards greater deference to the district courts.”150
Commentators generally have praised the Supreme Court’s adoption of
more deferential claim construction review.151 Some commentators even
appealable final decision in the Eastern District is more likely to require incurring the
entire expense and risk of trial. Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S.
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857.
148 Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015); Brief for Intel Corp. et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831 (2015); Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellant, Lighting Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744
F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
149 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 831, 841 (2015)
150 Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD
TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 10).
151 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Restoring the Fact/Law Distinction in
Patent Claim Construction, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 187 (2015); Jason Rantanen,
Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD TECH. L.J. __ (2015).
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have criticized the Federal Circuit for not vigorously implementing
deferential review post-Teva and urged an expansive reading of the
deferential review required by Teva.152
III. LESSONS FROM THE INTERSECTION OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND
PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES
This Part turns from the descriptive to the normative. Part II
described the overlooked connection between claim construction and patent
assertion entities, as well as how patent assertion entities benefit from
problems and trends in claim construction doctrine. This Part addresses
what this descriptive account means for the patent system.
A. If You Care About Patent Assertion Entities, You Should Care
About Claim Construction
A sometimes fierce debate exists within the patent community as to
whether patent assertion entities are good, bad, or neutral for the patent
system.153 This Essay does not take sides in that debate. Regardless of
one’s views of patent assertion entities, it is useful to recognize the
connection to claim construction issues and trends.
For those who believe that concerns about patent assertion entities
are overblown or that patent assertion entities play a beneficial role in the
patent system, this Essay will probably be of little import. Hopefully, they
will find the descriptive account interesting and recognition of the
relationship between claim construction doctrine and patent assertion
entities useful. However, they will be undisturbed by the fact that the
issues and trends in claim construction help patent assertion entities,
though perhaps (as I do154) they will find the issues and trends in claim
construction problematic in their own right.
On the other hand, for the majority of the patent community
concerned (to some extent) about patent assertion entities, this Essay
should serve as a wake-up call. Problems with claim construction are
generally ignored in debates and reforms related to patent assertion
entities. If anything, claim construction is treated as a solution, not a
cause, of the “patent troll problem.”155 This Essay suggests that claim
152 Jason Rantanen, Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, __ STANFORD
TECH. L.J. __ (2015) (manuscript at 18-22).
153 See Part I.A, supra.
154 See Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1353 (2014); Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An
Ordinary Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243 (2014); Greg
Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong Claim
Construction Issue for En Banc Review, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43 (2013).
155 See Part I.C, supra.
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construction problems contribute to the effectiveness of patent assertion
entities. More troubling, claim construction doctrine and commentary is
moving in a direction that favors patent assertion entities. If patent
assertion entities are as problematic as many in the patent community
believe, then it is important to address the underlying problems of claim
construction and reconsider the direction in which claim construction is
moving. Those in the crosshairs of patent assertion entities – the nation’s
leading technology companies – seem to have reached this very
conclusion.156
This Essay also contributes to debates over claim construction. At
times, claim construction feels as if it is in a time warp, with the battle
lines and arguments drawn in the early 2000s and little changed in the
intervening years, despite significant changes in the patent litigation
landscape. Claim construction is the one area immune from analysis about
how the rise of patent assertion entities over the past decade has changed
the patent landscape. Likewise, the dramatic concentration of patent cases
in the Eastern District of Texas over the past decade plays little part in
claim construction discussions. Commentators praise recent developments
in claim construction, like the Teva decision, even as they acknowledge
that the success of these developments depend on faithful implementation
by district judges.157 Whether this will occur is questionable in the current
patent litigation landscape, where approaching half of all patent cases are
filed in a single district exactly because that district has consistently
applied the law in a way to favor patentees, including patent assertion
entities.158
Those debating claim construction issues would be well-advised to
consider the consequences for patent assertion entities of various
approaches to claim construction. Some may believe that trends in claim
Brief of Google Inc. et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant 4, Lighting
Ballast Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 744 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en
banc) (“[T]he root causes of uncertainty in claim construction are vaguely drafted claims
and contradictory claim-construction methodologies, not appellate review. Deference
would not ameliorate those causes of uncertainty; it would make them worse. Deference
would . . . incentivize [district judges] to rely more on the extrinsic evidence presented
in any given case, and less on what a patent actually says, in hopes of securing greater
deference.”).
157 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Restoring the Fact/Law Distinction in
Patent Claim Construction, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 187, 197-199 (2015). To be fair,
in other work, Professors Anderson and Menell recognize (but dismiss) the relationship
of deferential review of claim construction and “renegade” districts like the Eastern
District of Texas. J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An
Historical, Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW.
U. L. REV. 1, 68, 70 (2013)
158 See Part II.C.1, supra; see also J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent
Cases, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 631(2015); Daniel M. Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum
Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2538857.
156
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construction rules, like deferential review and the general meaning
approach, are warranted despite (or except for) the positive effect for
patent assertion entities. That certainly could be true, though I have
previously doubted it.159 Regardless, the consequences for patent assertion
entities are a cost of these trends that should be weighed in any costbenefit analysis of claim construction rules.
This is not to say that claim construction doctrine should be applied
differently in cases brought by patent assertion entities or designed in a
particular way solely to combat patent assertion entities. Rather, I agree
with Professor Lemley and Douglas Melamed that “[p]atent trolls alone are
not the problem; they are a symptom of larger problems with the patent
system.”160 This Essay builds on their work. That patent assertion entities
thrive under current claim construction doctrine and trends suggests that
claim construction is one of those “larger problems” of which patent
assertion entities are a “symptom.” As Lemley and Melamed conclude,
“[e]xposing the larger problems allows us to contemplate changes in patent
law that will actually tackle the underlying pathologies of the patent
system and the abusive conduct they enable.”161 There is a need to
reconsider claim construction rules and trends not simply because they
help patent assertion entities but because this effect suggests claim
construction doctrine is problematic in its own right.
To be clear, this Essay only argues that reversing current trends in
claim construction could help address the success and influence of patent
assertion entities, not that it is the only way of doing so. It is possible that
other patent reforms will successfully combat patent assertion entities,
without the need for any changes to the general doctrine or trends in claim
construction. For example, perhaps venue reform that limits the ability to
file in the Eastern District of Texas will undermine patent assertion
entities.162
Similarly, Professor Lemley’s suggestion for limiting software
functional claiming could be sufficient to address patent assertion entities.
159 See Greg Reilly, Completing the Picture of Uncertain Patent Scope, 91 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1353 (2014); Greg Reilly, Judicial Capacities and Patent Claim Construction: An
Ordinary Reader Standard, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 243 (2014); Greg
Reilly, Improvidently Granted: Why the Federal Circuit Chose the Wrong Claim
Construction Issue for En Banc Review, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 43 (2013).
160 Mark A. Lemley & Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forests for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2121 (2013).
161 Mark A. Lemley & Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forests for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2121 (2013)
162 J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: An Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
68, 70 (2013) (arguing that venue is a better tool “to address concerns about districts
seeking to attract patent cases” than de novo review of claim construction).
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Over half of patent assertion entity cases involve software patents,163 and
estimates are that 100% of the software claims asserted by patent
assertion entities use functional claim language.164 To some extent,
Professor Lemley’s proposal is consistent with the analysis in this Essay.
This Essay suggests that persistent split in the Federal Circuit’s claim
construction precedent and the continued vitality of the general meaning
approach to claim construction are significant factors in the uncertainty
and overbreadth of claim scope on which patent assertion entities rely.165
Professor Lemley would create special rules for interpreting software
functional claims that are more consistent with the patent-focused
approach than the general meaning approach. Doing so would mitigate the
problems created by the persistence of both the claim construction split
generally and the general meaning approach specifically, perhaps
sufficiently to severely undermine patent assertion entities’ prospects of
success.
For several reasons, however, it is still important to recognize the
connection between general claim construction problems and patent
assertion entities. First, approximately 40% of patent assertion entity
cases do not involve functional software claims and would be unaffected by
Professor Lemley’s proposal.166 Second, although the en banc Federal
Circuit recently expanded the circumstances in which claims will be
deemed so-called “means-plus-function” claims that are limited to the
corresponding structure disclosed in the specification,167 Professor Lemley’s
broader proposal to limit all functional claims to the means disclosed for
performing the function disclosed in the specification has not been adopted.
Third, even if Professor Lemley’s proposal were adopted, the line between
functional and non-functional claims is murky. Skilled claim drafters are
likely to find creative ways to write claims that are the equivalent of
functional claims while avoiding the “functional” label and the special
claim construction rules that would come with it.
B. Claim Construction Problems Undermine Other Efforts to
Combat Patent Assertion Entities
To this point, I have focused on how the problems and trends in
claim construction directly benefit patent assertion entities. But claim
construction doctrine is relevant to the debate over patent assertion
163 James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION,
26, 29 (Winter 2011-2012) (finding 62% of patents asserted in patent assertion entity
cases were software patents).
164 Mark A. Lemley, Functional Claiming, 2013 WISCONSIN L. REV. 905, 920 n.65.
165 See Part II.A, B., supra.
166 James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, REGULATION,
26, 29 (Winter 2011-2012).
167 Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, No. 2013-1130 (Fed. Cir. June 16, 2015) (en
banc in relevant part).
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entities for another, indirect reason. The problems and trends in claim
construction undermine the effectiveness of many of the leading proposals
to combat patent assertion entities.
Most proposals to combat patent assertion entities are motivated by
the belief that patent assertion entities bring weak claims and that
mechanisms are needed to deter or weed out these weak claims. Proposals
abound, including heightened pleading requirements, fee shifting, and Rule
11 sanctions.168 These proposals generally require a determination that
the claim lacked merit when brought. This is obviously true of heightened
pleading requirements. It also true of Rule 11 sanctions, which require the
contentions in the complaint to have factual and legal support at the time
the attorney signs and files the complaint.169 Likewise, proposals that
would require the non-prevailing party to pay the attorneys’ fees of the
prevailing party would excuse fee shifting if “the position and conduct of
the non-prevailing party or parties were reasonably justified in law and
fact,” or something significantly equivalent.170
However, under the current state of claim construction,
requirements like “reasonably justified” and “plausible” are very low
thresholds for the patentee to pass. An issued patent benefits from the
statutory presumption of validity, which likely is sufficient for a plaintiff to
be “reasonably justified” or “plausible” in believing the patent is not
invalid. Claim construction is often decisive or determinative as to the
infringement question.171 In light of the issues with claim construction
discussed above, how difficult is it really for a patentee to identify a
“reasonably justified” or “plausible” claim construction (and therefore
infringement) position?172 The patentee has two equally valid claim
construction methodologies from which to choose, methodologies that result
in differing claim scope. As a result of the continued vitality of the general
meaning approach, the patentee need only be able to find a dictionary,
scientific text, or paid expert willing to support its claim construction
position in order for it to be “reasonably justified” and “plausible.”

168 H.R. 9, 114th Cong., 1st Session, at 6 (as introduced in the House, Feb. 5, 2015)
(providing for heightened pleading requirements and fee shifting); Eric Rogers & Young
Jeon, Inhibiting Patent Trolls: A New Approach for Applying Rule 11, 12 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 291 (2014) (proposing greater use of Rule 11 sanctions).
169 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
170 H.R. 9, 114th Cong., 1st Session, at 6 (as introduced in the House, Feb. 5, 2015).
171 See Part I.B.1, supra.
172 Eric Rogers & Young Jeon, Inhibiting Patent Trolls: A New Approach for
Applying Rule 11, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 291, 319 (2014) (noting that “any
independent, good-faith construction” and any construction that is “not frivolous” would
bar Rule 11 sanctions); but see Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerCrysler Corp., 726 F.3d 1306
(2013) (finding case exceptional for purposes of fee shifting because “the written
description provides no support for Taurus’s unreasonably broad construction”).
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Due to the uncertainty and breadth of potential claim scope under
current claim construction doctrine, the patentee will fairly easily be able
to state a plausible, good faith claim at the time of filing. Thus, efforts to
address the patent assertion entity “problem” that rely on identifying
claims that lack merit at the time of filing may prove ineffective.173
CONCLUSION
For too long, the vigorous debates over patent assertion entities and
claim construction have operated independent of each other. Current
problems and trends in claim construction have important consequences
for debates over patent assertion entities, as they tend to help the litigation
position of patent assertion entities. Those concerned about patent
assertion entities would be well-advised to reconsider the direction that
claim construction is moving. Those concerned about claim construction
would be well-advised to consider the consequences of various claim
construction rules for patent assertion entities. This Essay contributes to
both the debates over patent assertion entities and the debates over claim
construction by recognizing the important, but overlooked, links between
claim construction and patent assertion entities.
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